Several security models of multiple-access channel (MAC) are investigated. First, we study the degraded MAC with confidential messages, where two users transmit their confidential messages (no common message) to a destination, and each user obtains a degraded version of the output of the MAC. Each user views the other user as a eavesdropper, and wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the other user. Measuring each user's uncertainty about the other user's confidential message by equivocation, the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region for this model have been provided. The result is further explained via the binary and Gaussian examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transmission of confidential messages has been studied in the literature of several classes of channels. Wyner, in his well-known paper on the wiretap channel [1] , studied the problem that how to transmit the confidential messages to the legitimate receiver via a degraded broadcast channel, while keeping the wiretapper as ignorant of the messages as possible. Measuring the uncertainty of the wiretapper by equivocation, the capacity-equivocation region was established. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity was also established, which provided the maximum transmission rate with perfect secrecy. After the publication of Wyner's work, Csiszár and Körner [2] investigated a more general situation: the broadcast channels with confidential messages (BCC). In this model, a common message and a confidential message were sent through a general broadcast channel. The common message was assumed to be decoded correctly by the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, while the confidential message was only allowed to be obtained by the legitimate receiver. This model is also a generalization of [3] , where no confidentiality condition is imposed. The capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region of BCC [2] were totally determined, and the results were also a generalization of those in [1] . Based on Wyner's work, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman studied the Gaussian wiretap channel(GWC) [4] , and showed that its secrecy capacity was the difference between the main channel capacity and the overall wiretap channel capacity (the cascade of main channel and wiretap channel). Some other related works on the wiretap channel (including feedback, side information and secret key) can be found in [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] .
Recently, the information-theoretical security for other multi-user communication systems has been investigated.
The relay channel with confidential messages was studied in [11] , and the interference channel with confidential messages was studied in [12] . For the multiple-access channel, the security problems are split into two directions.
The first is that two users wish to transmit their corresponding messages to a destination, and meanwhile, they also receive the channel output. Each user treats the other user as a wiretapper, and wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the wiretapper. This model is usually called the MAC with confidential messages, and it was studied by [13] , see Figure 1 . An inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is provided for the model of Figure 1 , and the capacity-equivocation region is still not known. Furthermore, for the model of MAC with one confidential message [13] , both inner and outer bounds on capacity-equivocation region are derived. Moreover, for the degraded MAC with one confidential message, the capacity-equivocation region is totally determined. 3 The second is that an additional wiretapper has access to the MAC output via a wiretap channel, and therefore, how to keep the confidential messages of the two users as secret as possible from the additional wiretapper is the main concern of the system designer. This model is usually called the multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT).
Fig. 1: MAC with confidential messages
The Gaussian MAC-WT was investigated by [14] , see Figure 2 . An inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is provided for the Gaussian MAC-WT. Other related works on MAC-WT can be found in [15] , [16] .
Fig. 2: Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel
In this paper, firstly we study a special case of Figure 1 , where two users wish to transmit their confidential messages (no common message) to a destination, and meanwhile, they also receive a degraded version of the channel output, see Figure 3 . Each user wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the other user. Measuring each user's uncertainty about the other one's confidential message by equivocation, the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided for this model. Then, as examples, we establish the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions for the Gaussian and binary cases of Furthermore, if the received symbols for the wiretapper is a degraded version of the symbols for the legitimate receiver (usually called degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders), we also establish the capacity-equivocation region for this special case. For the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided. Finally, as examples, we give the capacity-equivocation region for the binary degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, and the secrecy capacity region for the binary degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders. . Let p V (v) denote the probability mass function P r{V = v}. Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region of the model of Figure 3 are determined in Theorem 1 and Remark 1, respectively. Then, as two examples, the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian and binary cases of The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region for the model of Figure 4 with non-cooperative encoders are shown in Section V. In Section VI, we will show the binary examples about the model of Figure 4 with cooperative or non-cooperative encoders. Final conclusions are provided in Section VII.
II. DEGRADED MAC WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, a description of the model of Figure 3 is given by Definition 1 to Definition 3. The capacityequivocation region R (A) composed of all achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) tuples in the model of Figure 3 is characterized in Theorem 1, where the achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) tuple is defined in Definition 4. Definition 2: (Channels) The MAC is a DMC with finite input alphabet X 1 × X 2 , finite output alphabet Y, and transition probability Q 1 (y|x 1 , x 2 ), where 
and user 1's equivocation about W 2 is defined as
where (a) and (b) are from
Let P e be the error probability of the receiver , and it is defined as P r{(
Definition 4: (Achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) tuple in the model of Figure 3 ) A tuple (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) (where
is called achievable if, for any > 0 (where is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , P e ) such that
3)
The capacity-equivocation region R (A) is a set composed of all achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) tuples. The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R (A) are provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively, and they are proved in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Theorem 1: (Inner bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R (Ai) is as follows,
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• The region R (A) is convex, and the proof is directly obtained by introducing a time sharing random variable into Theorem 1, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
• Note that Theorem 1 indicates a tradeoff between the two equivocations R e1 and R e2 , i.e., R e1 + R e2 ≤
• The achievable secrecy region
Corollary 1:
Proof: Corollary 1 is easy to be checked by substituting R e1 = R 1 and R e2 = R 2 into R (Ai) .
Theorem 2: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R (Ao) is as follows,
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 2, see the following.
• The region R (A) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The outer bound C (Ao) s on the secrecy capacity region is the set of pairs
Corollary 2:
Proof: Corollary 2 is easy to be checked by substituting R e1 = R 1 and R e2 = R 2 into R (Ao) .
III. GAUSSIAN AND BINARY MACS WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
A. The Gaussian Case of the Model of Figure 3 In this subsection, we study the Gaussian case of Figure 3 , where the channel input-output relationships at each
and
where are subject to the average power constraints P 1 and P 2 , respectively, i.e.,
The following Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region of Gaussian MAC with confidential messages.
Theorem 3:
For the Gaussian case of Figure 3 , the inner bound R (Bi) on the capacity-equivocation region R
is given by
Proof: See Appendix C.
Corollary 3:
The inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 3 is
Proof: Substituting R e1 = R 1 and R e2 = R 2 into the region R (Bi) in Theorem 3, Corollary 3 is easily obtained.
The inner bound on the secrecy capacity C
where β * is determined by the following equation:
Proof: The proof of (3.10) follows directly from Corollary 3.
Theorem 4:
For the Gaussian case of Figure 3 , the outer bound R (Bo) on the capacity-equivocation region R
(3.12)
Corollary 4:
The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 3 is
(3.13)
Proof: Substituting R e1 = R 1 and R e2 = R 2 into the region R (Bo) in Theorem 4, Corollary 4 is easily obtained.
The outer bound on the secrecy capacity C
Proof: The proof of (3.14) follows directly from Corollary 4. increase, which implies that the noise level of the wiretap channels to both users increases, both users become more confused by the channel outputs. Thus, the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region enlarge.
B. The Binary Case of the Model of Figure 3 In this subsection, we study the following binary case of Figure 3 . Assume that all channel inputs and outputs take values in {0, 1}, and the channels are discrete memoryless. The input-output relationship of the channels at Theorem 5: For the binary case of Figure 3 , the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region R (C) is given by 17) where
Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollary 5:
The inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of Figure 3 is
Proof: Substituting R e1 = R 1 and R e2 = R 2 into the region R (Ci) in Theorem 5, Corollary 5 is easily obtained.
Theorem 6:
For the binary case of Figure 3 , the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region R (C) is given by
where
Corollary 6:
The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of Figure 3 is
Proof: Substituting R e1 = R 1 and R e2 = R 2 into the region R (Co) in Theorem 5, Corollary 6 is easily obtained. Figure 6 plots the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity of the binary case of Figure 3 for h(q) = 0.6 and h(p) = 0.8. Note that p and q are the cross-over probabilities of the wiretap channels to both users, and as p Definition 6: (Channel) The MAC-WT is a DMC with finite input alphabet X 1 × X 2 , finite output alphabet Y × Z, and transition probability Q 1 (y, z|x 1 , x 2 ), where
The inputs of the channel are X The wiretapper's equivocation to the confidential messages W 1 and W 2 is defined as
Definition 8: (Achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e ) triple in the model of Figure 4 ) A triple (R 1 , R 2 , R e ) (where R 1 , R 2 , R e > 0) is called achievable if, for any > 0 (where is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, ∆, P e ) such that
Theorem 7 gives a single-letter characterization of the set R (D) , which is composed of all achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e ) triples in the model of Figure 4 , and it is proved in Appendix E and Appendix F.
Theorem 7:
A single-letter characterization of the region R (D) is as follows,
, and U , U 1 , U 2 may be assumed to be (deterministic) functions of V .
Remark 3:
There are some notes on Theorem 7, see the following.
• The region R (D) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U , U 1 , U 2 and V satisfy U ≤ X 1 X 2 + 1,
The proof is in Appendix G.
• The secrecy capacity region
Corollary 7:
For the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, i.e., (
is given in the following Theorem 8, and it is proved in Appendix H.
Theorem 8:
A single-letter characterization of the region R (E) for the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders is as follows,
, and U 1 , U 2 may be assumed to be (deterministic) functions of V .
Remark 4:
There are some notes on Theorem 8, see the following.
• For the degraded case, the last bound in Theorem 8 can be obtained from the corresponding bound of Theorem 7, see the following.
Therefore, the converse proof of Theorem 8 is directly obtained from that of Theorem 7 and the above (4.3).
• The region R (E) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U 1 , U 2 and V satisfy
The proof is similar to Appendix G, and it is omitted here.
Corollary 8:
Proof: Corollary 8 is easy to be checked by substituting
V. DEGRADED MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH NON-COOPERATIVE ENCODERS
In this section, we will present inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders. For the non-cooperative model, the input of encoder 1 is W 1 , while the output of encoder 1 is X N 1 . Similarly, the input and output of encoder 2 are W 2 and X N 2 , respectively. The encoders are stochastic encoders, i.e., the encoder g * N i 
Remark 5: There are some notes on Theorem 9, see the following.
• The region R (G) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
Corollary 9: (Inner bound on secrecy capacity region) The secrecy capacity region C
s , where
Proof: Corollary 9 is easy to be checked by substituting
Theorem 10: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R (H) is as follows,
Remark 6: There are some notes on Theorem 10, see the following.
• The region R (H) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• Corollary 10: (Outer bound on secrecy capacity region) The secrecy capacity region C
, where
Proof: Corollary 10 is easy to be checked by substituting R e = R 1 + R 2 into R (H) . where
To understand the relationship of the inner bound C 
VI. BINARY DEGRADED MAC-WT WITH COOPERATIVE (OR NON-COOPERATIVE) ENCODERS

A. The Binary Case of the Degraded MAC-WT with Cooperative Encoders
In this subsection, we study the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders. Assume that all channel inputs and outputs take values in {0, 1}, and the channels are discrete memoryless. The input-output relationship of the channels at each time instant satisfies
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and Z * N is composed of N i.i.d. random variables with distribution P r{Z * i = 1} = p and P r{Z *
Theorem 11: For the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, the capacity-equivocation region R (I) is given by
Proof: By calculating the mutual information terms in Theorem 8, Theorem 11 is easy to be checked, and therefore, the proof is omitted here.
Corollary 11:
The secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders is
Proof: Substituting R e = R 1 + R 2 into the region R (I) in Theorem 11, Corollary 11 is easily obtained. , the secrecy capacity region tends to be the capacity region of the binary MAC.
B. The Binary Case of the Degraded MAC-WT with Non-Cooperative Encoders
In this subsection, we study the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders. Assume that all channel inputs and outputs take values in {0, 1}, and the channels are discrete memoryless. The input-output relationship of the channels at each time instant satisfies
Theorem 12: For the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, the inner bound on the secrecy capacity region is coincident with the corresponding outer bound. Therefore, the secrecy capacity region
Proof: See Appendix K.
Fig. 9:
The secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, and the capacity region of the binary MAC Figure 9 shows the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, and the capacity region of the binary MAC. It is easy to see that as p → 1 2 , the secrecy capacity region tends to be the capacity region of the binary MAC.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we study the model of degraded MAC with confidential messages. The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region are provided for this model. Second, as two examples, the binary and Gaussian cases of the degraded MAC with confidential messages are studied, and the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions are also given for the two examples.
Third, we investigate the MAC-WT with cooperative encoders. The capacity-equivocation regions and the corresponding secrecy capacity regions are determined for both the general model and the degraded model. Fourth, for the model of degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, we present inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region. Finally, we give binary examples for the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative (or non-cooperative) encoders.
Ai , we will show that (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) is achievable. Without loss of generality, the proof of Theorem 1 is considered into the following four cases.
• (Case 1) If I(X 2 ; Y ) ≥ I(X 2 ; Y 1 |X 1 ) and R 2 ≤ I(X 2 ; Y ), we only need to prove that the tuple (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 )
, is achievable.
• (Case 2) If I(X 2 ; Y ) ≥ I(X 2 ; Y 1 |X 1 ) and R 2 ≥ I(X 2 ; Y ), we only need to prove that the tuple (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 )
, we only need to prove that the tuple
is achievable.
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. Some preliminaries about typical sequences are introduced in Subsection A-A. For the four cases, the construction of the code is introduced in Subsection A-B.
For any given > 0, the proofs of lim N →∞
and P e ≤ are given in Subsection A-C.
A. Preliminaries
• Given a probability mass function p V (v), for any η > 0, let T We say that the sequences v N ∈ T N V (η) are V -typical.
• Analogously, given a joint probability mass function p V W (v, w), for any η > 0, let T 
is the number of occurences of (v, w) in the pair of sequences (v N , w N ). We say that the pairs
• Lemma 1:
where η * → 0 as η → 0.
B. Coding Construction
The code constructions for the four cases are almost the same (by using Wyner's random binning technique), except that the total number of x N 1 and x N 2 are different, see the followings.
• For case 1, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that
. Given a tuple (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ), choose a joint probability mass function p X1,X2,Y,Y1,Y2 (x 1 , x 2 , y, y 1 , y 2 ) such that
It is easy to check that the last three inequalities in Theorem 1 hold by using the conditions that R e1 =
The confidential message sets W 1 and W 2 satisfy the following conditions:
Code-book generation for case 1: to a specific value in W 2 .
• For case 2, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that
a joint probability mass function p X1,X2,Y,Y1,Y2 (x 1 , x 2 , y, y 1 , y 2 ) such that
The confidential message sets W 1 and W 2 also satisfy (6).
Code-book generation for case 2: • For case 3, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that
Code-book generation for case 3: • For case 4, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that
Code-book generation for case 4: • (Decoding scheme for all cases) For a given y N , try to find a pair of sequences (x
If there exist sequences with the same indicesŵ 1 andŵ 2 , put out the correspondingŵ 1 andŵ 2 , else declare a decoding error.
C. Proof of the Achievability
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that lim N →∞ log W1 N = R 1 and lim N →∞ log W2 N = R 2 for the two cases.
From the standard techniques as in [18, Ch. 14], we have P e ≤ for all cases.
It remains to show that lim N →∞ ∆ 1 ≥ R e1 and lim N →∞ ∆ 2 ≥ R e2 for the four cases, see the followings.
• (Proof of lim N →∞ ∆ 1 ≥ R e1 and lim N →∞ ∆ 2 ≥ R e2 for case 1)
First, we compute the following equivocation rate of W 1 .
where (a) is from
and the fact that X N 2 is independent of W 1 and X N 1 . The first term in (7) can be bounded as follows.
where (8) is from the property of the strong typical sequences.
The second term in (7) is as follows.
For the third term in (7), we have
This is because for a given w 1 , there are 2 N (I(X1;Y |X2)− N −R1) codewords left for x N 1 . Then note that
and N → 0 as N → ∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano's inequality, we have (10).
For the fourth term in (7), we have
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (8), (9), (10) and (11) into (7), we have
lim N →∞ ∆ 1 ≥ R e1 is proved. Analogously, we can prove that lim N →∞ ∆ 2 ≥ R e2 , see the following.
where (a) is from W 2 → (X 
where (14) is from the property of the strong typical sequences.
The second term in (13) is as follows.
This is because for a given w 2 , there are 2 N (I(X2;Y )− N −R2) codewords left for x N 2 . Then note that
and N → 0 as N → ∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano's inequality, we have (16) .
For the fourth term in (13), we have
Substituting (14), (15), (16) and (17) into (13), we have
lim N →∞ ∆ 2 ≥ R e2 is proved. Therefore, the proof for case 1 is completed.
• (Proof of lim N →∞ ∆ 1 ≥ R e1 and lim N →∞ ∆ 2 ≥ R e2 for case 2, case 3 and case 4) Note that (7) and (13) are similar to that of case 1. Therefore, we omit the proof here. The proof for case 2, case 3 and case 4 is completed.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2: all the achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) tuples are contained in the set R (Ao) , i.e., for any achievable tuple, there exist random variables X 1 , X 2 , Y , Y 1 and Y 2 such that the inequalities in Theorem 2 hold, and
forms a Markov chain. We will prove the inequalities of Theorem 2 in the remainder of this section.
The proof of this inequality is as follows.
where (a) is from the Fano's inequality, (b) is from the data processing theorem, (c) is from the fact that X N 1 and X N 2 are independent, (d) is from the discrete memoryless property of the channel, and (e) is from the definitions that X 1 (X 1,J , J), X 2 (X 2,J , J), Y Y J , where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }),
and it is independent of X 1,i , X 2,i and Y i .
By using P e ≤ , R 1 = lim N →∞
H(W1) N
and (1), it is easy to see that 0 ≤ R 1 ≤ I(X 1 ; Y |X 2 ).
(Proof of 0 ≤ R 2 ≤ I(X 2 ; Y |X 1 )) The proof is similar to the proof of 0 ≤ R 1 ≤ I(X 1 ; Y |X 2 ), and it is omitted here.
where (1) is from the Fano's inequality, (2) is from the data processing theorem, (3) is from the discrete memoryless property of the channel, and (4) is from the definitions that
and (2), it is easy to see that
(Proof of 0 ≤ R e1 ≤ R 1 and 0 ≤ R e2 ≤ R 2 ) The two inequalities are obtained by the following equations.
The proof is obtained by the following (5), (6), and P e ≤ .
where (a) is from the Fano's inequality, and (b) is from
, and (g) is from the definitions that X 1 (X 1,J , J),
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }), and it is independent of X 1,i , X 2,i , Y i and Y 2,i .
The proof is analogous to the proof of
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3 AND THEOREM 4
A. Proof of Theorem 3
The achievability proof follows by computing the mutual information terms in Theorem 1 with the following joint distributions:
.
X 1 is independent of X 2 .
B. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of R e1 ≤ All the random variables take values in {0, 1}. Let P r{X 1 = 0} = α, P r{X 1 = 1} = 1 − α, P r{X 2 = 0} = β and P r{X 2 
where X 1 is independent of X 2 , and P r{Z 1 = 0} = 1 − p, P r{Z 1 = 1} = p, P r{Z 2 = 0} = 1 − q, P r{Z 2 = 1} = q.
The joint probability p X1X2Y is calculated by (8) .
The joint probability p X1X2Y1 is calculated by (9) .
The joint probability p X1X2Y2 is calculated by (10) .
Then, the mutual information term I(X 1 ; Y |X 2 ) is
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are obtained.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF THEOREM 7
In this section, we establish the converse part of Theorem 7: all the achievable (R 1 , R 2 , R e ) triples are contained in the set R (D) . We will prove the inequalities in Theorem 7 in the remaining of this section.
where (a) is from the Fano's inequality and the fact that W 1 is independent of W 2 , (b) is from the definitions U 2,i
, and (c) is from the definitions that
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }), and it is independent of U 2,i , V i and Y i .
H(W1) N
and (12), it is easy to see that 0 ≤ R 1 ≤ I(V ; Y |U 2 ).
(Proof of 0 ≤ R 2 ≤ I(V ; Y |U 1 )) The proof is similar to the proof of 0 ≤ R 1 ≤ I(V ; Y |U 2 ), and it is omitted
where (1) is from the Fano's inequality, (2) is from the definition
), and (3) is from the definitions that V (V J , J), Y Y J , where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }), and it is independent of V i and Y i .
By using P e ≤ ,
and (13), it is easy to see that
This inequality is obtained by the following (14) .
(Proof of R e ≤ I(V ; Y |U ) − I(V ; Z|U )) The proof is obtained by substituting (16) , (17), (18) and (21) into (15) , and using P e ≤ and the definitions U (
where (a) is from the Fano's inequality.
Note that
Proof of (18): The right hand side of (18) is equal to
and the left hand side of (18) is equal to
and therefore, the formula (18) is verified by (19) and (20).
Analogously,
The Markov chain (U,
is directly obtained from the above definitions.
The proof of the converse part of Theorem 7 is completed.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THE DIRECT PART OF THEOREM 7
In this section we establish the direct part of Theorem 7(about existence). Suppose (R 1 , R 2 , R e ) ∈ R D , we will show that (R 1 , R 2 , R e ) is achievable.
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient condition R e = I(V ; Y |U ) − I(V ; Z|U ). Given a triple (R 1 , R 2 , R e ), choose a joint probability mass function
The message sets W 1 and W 2 satisfy the following conditions:
Now the remaining of this section is organized as follows. The encoding-decoding scheme is introduced in Subsection F-A. For any given > 0, the proofs of lim N →∞
R e and P e ≤ are given in Subsection F-B. 
A. Encoding-decoding Scheme
The encoding scheme for the MAC-WT with cooperative encoders is in Figure 10 . In the reminder of this subsection, we will introduce the realization of the random vectors in Figure 10 .
• (A realization of U 
where γ satisfies 0 ≤ γ ≤ min{I(U ; Y ), I(U ; Z)}.
-(The chosen of j, l and m) * (Case 1) If
Therefore, in this case, the chosen of u N (m) is based on w 1 and w 2 .
The indices j, l and m are chosen based on w 1 and w 2 . * (Case 2) If
where K is an arbitrary set such that (24) holds. Letḡ be a mapping of J into K, partitioning J into subsets of nearly equal size. Note that in this case, the chosen of u N (m) is not based on w 1 and w 2 .
The index j is randomly chosen from the setḡ −1 (k) ⊂ J (whereḡ −1 is the inverse mapping ofḡ, and k ∈ K).
The index m is chosen according to the label of u N (m).
The index l is chosen from L.
-(The construction of v . The transition probability of this new DMC is p X2|V (x 2 |v).
• (Decoding scheme of the legitimate receiver) For given y N , try to find a sequence v 
where (a) is from the Markov chain
The first term in (28) can be bounded as follows.
where (29) is from the property of the strong typical sequences and the construction of V N , see [2, p. 343 ].
The second term in (28) is as follows.
where (30) is from a similar proof in [2, p. 343].
For the third term in (28), we have
This is because for given m, w 1 and w 2 , there are at most 2 N I(V ;Z|U ) codewords left for v N . Then note that
From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano's inequality, we have (31).
For the fourth term in (28), we have
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343] .
Substituting (29), (30), (31) and (32) into (28), we have
Therefore, the achievability proof for Theorem 7 is completed.
APPENDIX G SIZE CONSTRAINTS OF THE AUXILIARY RANDOM VARIABLES IN THEOREM 7
By using the support lemma (see [17] , p.310), it suffices to show that the random variables U 1 , U 2 , U and V can be replaced by new ones, preserving the Markovity (U, U ≤ X 1 X 2 + 1,
The proof is in the reminder of this section.
Define the following continuous scalar functions ofp :
Since there are X 1 X 2 − 1 functions of f X1X2 (p), the total number of the continuous scalar functions ofp is
Letp X1X2|U = P r{X 1 = x 1 , X 2 = x 2 |U = u}. With these distributionsp X1X2|U , we have
According to the support lemma ( [17] , p.310), the random variable U can be replaced by new ones such that the new U takes at most X 1 X 2 + 1 different values and the expressions (35), (36) and (37) are preserved.
Similarly, we can prove that U 1 ≤ X 1 X 2 and U 2 ≤ X 1 X 2 .
Once the alphabets of U , U 1 , U 2 are fixed, we apply similar arguments to bound the alphabet of V , see the following. Define X 1 X 2 + 1 continuous scalar functions ofp X1X2 :
where of the functions f X1X2 (p X1X2 ), only X 1 X 2 − 1 are to be considered.
For fixed u, u 1 and u 2 , letp X1X2|V = P r{X 1 = x 1 , X 2 = x 2 |V = v}. With these distributionsp X1X2|V , we have
By the support lemma ( [17] , p.310), for fixed u, u 1 and u 2 , the size of the alphabet of the random variable V
can not be larger than X 1 X 2 + 1, and therefore, V ≤ (
The only difference between Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 is the upper bound of R e . Since the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders is a special case of the general model, and therefore, the converse proof of Theorem 8
can be directly obtained from the converse proof of Theorem 7 and (4.3). Now it remains to prove the achievability, see the remainder of this section.
The encoding-decoding scheme for Theorem 8 is a special case of that for Theorem 7, see Figure 11 . The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient condition R e = I(V ; Y ) − I(V ; Z). Given a triple
The construction of U N 1 and U N 2 in Figure 11 is the same as those in Appendix G, and V N is constructed as follows.
Generate 2 
If there exist sequences with the sameŵ 1 andŵ 2 , put out the correspondingŵ 1 andŵ 2 , else declare a decoding error.
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that lim N →∞
Then, observing the construction of V N , it is easy to see that the codewords of V N are upper-bounded by
. Therefore, from the standard channel coding theorem, for any given > 0 and sufficiently large N , we
have P e ≤ .
It remains to show that lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e , see the following.
The first term in (44) is
The second term in (44) is as follows.
For the third term in (44), we have
This is because for given w 1 and w 2 , there are 2 N (I(V ;Y )− N −R1−R2) codewords left for v N . Then note that
and N → 0 as N → ∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano's inequality, we have (47).
For the fourth term in (44), we have
Substituting (45), (46), (47) and (48) into (44), we have
lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is proved. Therefore, the achievability proof for Theorem 8 is completed.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Note that L (1) is analogous to L (2) , and L (3) is analogous to L (4) . Thus, in the remainder of this section, we
A. Achievability of L
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that R e = I(X 2 ; Y |X 1 ) − I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 ) + R 1 . Given a triple (R 1 , R 2 , R e ), choose a joint probability mass function p X1,X2,Y,Z (x 1 , x 2 , y, z) such that
Note that R e = I(X 2 ; Y |X 1 ) − I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 ) + R 1 implies that
Define
where γ ≥ 0.
The confidential message sets W 1 and W 2 satisfy the following conditions: Decoding scheme: For a given y N , try to find a pair of sequences (x
Proof of the achievability: By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that lim N →∞ log W1 N = R 1 and
Then, note that the codewords of x Therefore, from the standard techniques as in [18, Ch. 14], we have P e ≤ .
The first term in (53) is
The second term in (53) can be bounded as follows.
This is because for a given w 1 , there are 2
and N → 0 as N → ∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano's inequality, we have (56).
For the fourth term in (53), we have
The fifth term in (53) is
For the sixth term in (53), we have
This is because for given w 2 and x 
where (1) is from (50), and N → 0 as N → ∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano's inequality, we have (59).
For the seventh term in (53), we have
Substituting (54), (55), (56), (57), (58), (59) and (60) into (53), we have
where (a) is from (51).
Thus, lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is proved.
B. Achievability of L (3)
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that R e = I(X 1 , X 2 ; Y ) − I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z).
Given a triple (R 1 , R 2 , R e ), choose a joint probability mass function p X1,X2,Y,Z (x 1 , x 2 , y, z) such that
The confidential message sets W 1 and W 2 satisfy the following conditions: 
The second term in (63) can be bounded as follows. 
The fifth term in (63) is
For the sixth term in (63), we have
APPENDIX J PROOF OF THEOREM 10
In this section, we prove Theorem 10. The first three bounds in Theorem 10 are the capacity region the MAC, and the proof is omitted. It remains to prove R e ≤ R 1 + R 2 and R e ≤ I(X 1 , X 2 ; Y ) − I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z), see the followings.
(Proof of R e ≤ R 1 + R 2 ) The inequality is obtained by the following equation.
(Proof of R e ≤ I(X 1 , X 2 ; Y ) − I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z)) The proof is obtained by the following (73). 
where ( All the random variables take values in {0, 1}. Let P r{X 1 = 0} = α, P r{X 1 = 1} = 1 − α, P r{X 2 = 0} = β and P r{X 2 = 1} = 1 − β. Note that X 1 , X 2 , Y and Z satisfy
where X 1 is independent of X 2 , and P r{Z * = 0} = 1 − p, P r{Z * = 1} = p.
The joint probability p X1X2Y is calculated by the following (75).
p X1,X2,Y (x 1 , x 2 , y) = p Y |X1,X2 (y|x 1 , x 2 )p X1 (x 1 )p X2 (x 2 ).
The joint probability p X1X2Z is calculated by the following (76).
Then, C
Moreover, C 
It is easy to see that C (G) s and C (H) s are the same for the binary case, and therefore, the secrecy capacity region for the binary case of degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders is
